EIP-13: Voluntary Lockups

EIP-13: Voluntary Lockups

Author: @eqparenthesis


Empty Set Dollar was originally created by an anonymous team: the {ess}. Though we’ve always strived to play fairly, we can’t provide the same level of accountability as a publicly known team. To help, we propose introducing a voluntary mechanism that will allow our team to lock up its bonded funds with an on-chain unlocking schedule. Though not required, other participants may choose to opt-in to this mechanism as well if it makes sense for their specific situation.


To optimize for simplicity, this can be implemented as an extra check in the unbond method. At time of initial lock, the user’s ESDS balance will be snapshotted. This value can be then be combined with the elapsed time to determine how much ESDS is eligible for unbonding at any given time.


We will use block.timestamp to measure unlocking progressing since epoch length has, and will likely continue to, change in duration.

Unlocking Period

Locked ESDS will be unlocked linearly over a 4 year period starting from protocol launch.


A concern I have is that by not selling, the ESS maintains or grows their relatively large share of the network/stablecoin supply. Do you think this is an issue?

@rewkang I’m not personally concerned about this. Anyone who only bonds without buying more ESD or participating in the LP or coupon activities will see their share of the supply decrease over time.

I don’t see any reason to oppose this proposal. The {ess} could follow the same strategy without approval if they want to. They don’t personally get any direct benefit from locking themselves in this way, other than increasing confidence in the project by providing stronger certainty about their long-term orientation.


Since the lock would be enforced on the “unbond” step, I assume, it would not affect the ability to vote on proposals? This was my only concern.

Agree with Dan on decreasing share of the protocol if team’s ESD remains bonded to DAO only.

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